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TRAILING IN THE WAKE: THE FREEDOM
OF SPEECH IN MONTANA
John Wolff*
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite evidence that Article II, Section 7 affords greater protection to
speech than the First Amendment, the Montana Supreme Court has consist-
ently held otherwise.1 Instead, the Montana Supreme Court has concluded
that if a law is constitutional under the First Amendment, it is also constitu-
tional under Article II, Section 7.2 Given the currently lofty protection
speech receives under the First Amendment, this usually presents no prob-
lem. However, the Montana Supreme Court has often broken from federal
precedent to provide Montanans with less, not more, protection. This
presents a two-fold problem. First, in some areas of speech, Montanans
have received less than the minimally required safeguards of the First
Amendment.3 Second, even if censorship comports with the First Amend-
ment, it should not necessarily mean censorship comports with Article II,
Section 7’s arguably heightened, but certainly independent, protection.
Tethering Article II, Section 7 to the First Amendment means Montanans’
right to free speech is determined by the United States Constitution, not the
Montana Constitution. If the First Amendment is at low ebb some point in
the future,4 Article II, Section 7, should not fall with it.
The goal of this article is to establish the original meaning of the free-
dom of speech and expression in Article II, Section 7, of the 1972 Montana
Constitution, and then ascertain where the Montana Supreme Court’s prece-
dents stand in relation to the original meaning. Part II of this paper delves
into the development of the freedom of speech in Montana. First, in Part II-
A and II-B, the 1884 and 1889 Constitutions are analyzed for clues indicat-
ing whether the prohibition against “impairing” the freedom of speech was
a higher or lower protection than the U.S. Constitution’s prohibition against
“abridging” the freedom of speech. Next, Part II-C analyzes how the princi-
* J.D. 2015. The author would like to thank the editors and staff at the Montana Law Review for
their excellent criticism. In particular, any cohesiveness in thought present in the article is attributable to
the keen eye of Lucas Hamilton.
1. City of Helena v. Krautter, 852 P.2d 636, 638 (Mont. 1993).
2. Id.
3. E.g., W. Tradition P’ship v. Attorney Gen. of State, 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011).
4. The First Amendment, like most of the Bill of Rights, has suffered through some low points in
its history. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“When a nation is at war many things
that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be
endured . . . .”).
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ples laid down by the 1884 and 1889 Constitution were incorporated into
the 1972 Constitution’s freedom of speech protection. Building from that,
the transcripts of the 1972 Constitutional Convention, as well as the ratifi-
cation record, are dissected to discover whether the 1972 Constitution ad-
ded any additional protections to the freedom of speech. Part III applies
these conclusions to three areas of speech in Montana to examine whether
the Montana Supreme Court adheres to the original meaning of Article II,
Section 7. Part IV is a brief conclusion.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MONTANA’S FREE SPEECH PROTECTION
Montana’s free speech protection remained, with one exception, un-
changed throughout three constitutions. However, each constitution built on
its predecessor,5 and the drafters at the 1972 Constitutional Convention
placed special emphasis on expanding the protections afforded speech in
the 1884 and 1889 Constitutions.6 This history gives heightened importance
to the protection of speech found in the 1884 and 1889 Constitutions when-
ever the 1972 Constitution’s freedom of speech protection is being inter-
preted. The 1884 and 1889 Constitutions, then, are where to begin.
A. The 1884 Constitution: The Birth of Free Speech in Montana
The 1884 Convention debates and notes consist almost entirely of roll
calls and argument over the rules that governed the convention. Unfortu-
nately, the few substantive debates and notes that do exist are virtually il-
legible.7 There is still much that can be gleaned from the text itself, though.
Drafters placed the freedom of speech in the 1884 Constitution’s dec-
laration of rights in Article 1, Section 10:
That no law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech; that every per-
son shall be free to speak, write, or publish whatever he will on any subject,
being responsible for all abuse of that liberty; and that in all suits and prose-
cutions for libel, the truth thereof may be given in evidence, and the jury,
under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the fact.8
Article 1, Section 10, made three important departures from its federal
counterpart, of which only the first is of concern here: (1) the textual depar-
5. See 2 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 618 (1979) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT II] (noting that none of the traditional rights had been re-
duced, and in some instances new safeguards had been added); MONT. CONST. OF 1884, art. I, § 10;
MONT. CONST. OF 1889, art. III, § 10.
6. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT II, supra note 5 at 630.
7. There is a distinct lack of citations to the 1884 Constitution in academic writing. The conven-
tion was woefully under-recorded, but I suspect the lack of citations is also based on an inability to read
the recordings that do exist.
8. MONT. CONST. OF 1884, art. I, § 10.
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ture from abridging found in the First Amendment; (2) the granting of an
affirmative right absent in the First Amendment; and (3) the libel clause
absent in the First Amendment.9
In 1884, none of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights had been
incorporated against the States.10 Thus, the 1884 Convention was free to
provide less protection to Montanans in the 1884 Constitution than
Montanans received from the Federal Constitution.  This requires a broader
approach when analyzing the difference between impairing and abridging
because if there is a difference, the difference cannot automatically be con-
strued in favor of the 1884 Constitution providing more protection.
1. Finding Context From Other Departures From the Federal Text
It at least appears the 1884 Convention intended Montana’s protection
to be different because, instead of copying the Federal Constitution’s use of
“abridging,” it used “impairing.”11 If the 1884 Convention wanted the
clause’s prohibition to equal the force of the First Amendment’s prohibi-
tion, it seems an odd choice to deviate from that language in light of 1884
Constitution’s verbatim use elsewhere of the Federal Constitution’s other
amendments.12 Often when the text did make a departure, it was a substan-
tive change that provided either a heightened or lessened right relative to its
federal counterpart. For instance, the 1884 Constitution states no warrant
shall issue without “describing the place to be searched or the person or
thing to be seized, as near as may be.”13 The U.S. Constitution states no
warrant shall issue unless it “particularly describe[s] the place to be
searched.”14 “As near as may be” seems similar to “as best you can,”
whereas “particularly” demands a certain degree of detail that the State’s
best efforts may not always satisfy.15 Similarly, the 1884 Constitution pro-
vides that the accused shall have the right “to meet the witnesses against
him face to face,” whereas its federal counterpart provides that the accused
shall have the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”16
9. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. In 1925, the freedom of speech was the first to be incorporated against the states in Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). This fact is taken into account in the discussion on the 1972 Constitu-
tional Convention. See infra Part II-C.
11. MONT. CONST. OF 1884, art. I, § 10.
12. Compare U.S. CONST § 20 with U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; compare MONT. CONST. OF 1884,
art. I, § 25 with U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13. MONT. CONST. OF 1884, art. I, § 7 (emphasis added).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
15. A near contemporaneous dictionary defines “particularly” as “distinctly” and “in a high de-
gree.” WEBSTER’S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1046 (Noah Porter ed., 1913) [hereinafter 1913
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY] .
16. MONT. CONST. OF 1884, art. I, § 16; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3
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Although the recent Confrontation Clause cases have brought the two
clauses into closer harmony, the guarantee of a face-to-face meeting was a
significant departure from what the Confrontation Clause was understood to
require in 1884.17
On the other hand, there are places where the text departed with no
apparent intent to change the protection. For example, the 1884 Constitu-
tion provides that the writ of habeas corpus “shall never be suspended”
whereas its federal counterpart provides that it “shall not be suspended.”18
It would be elevating form over substance to suggest there is any difference
between “never” and “not” in that context.
Other sections of the 1884 Constitution present tougher questions. In
the 1884 Constitution a person shall not “be compelled to testify against
himself” whereas its federal counterpart provides that a person shall not “be
compelled . . . to be a witness against himself.”19 The Federal Constitution’s
use of “witness,” even in the late 19th century, was understood to protect all
persons from giving evidence against themselves in any investigation.20 Al-
though “testimony” has been expanded outside of trial proceedings to in-
clude any response in which the accused explicitly or implicitly relates a
factual assertion or discloses information,21 historically it was thought to
mean only the communication of facts under oath.22 However, “testify” and
“witness” had markedly similar definitions in the late 19th century.23 Thus,
it is unclear whether the 1884 Convention sought to limit the self-incrimina-
tion protection to the historically understood meaning of testify, or whether
they simply replaced “witness” with “testify” under the belief the terms had
equal meaning, and they simply preferred the term “testify.”
The foregoing analysis provides little help in determining when and
where there was an intentional departure from the Federal Constitution’s
protections. Although some intentional departures are clear both from the
17. See State v. Clark, 964 P.2d 766, 771–772 (Mont. 1998) (declining to follow federal precedent
because the Montana Constitution framers “saw fit to distinguish our Confrontation Clause from the
United States Constitution by insuring a criminal defendant the right ‘to meet the witnesses against him
face to face.’”). The text of the Montana Constitution’s Confrontation Clause remains unchanged since
1884.
18. MONT. CONST. OF 1884, art. I, § 21 (“Writ of Habeas Corpus shall never be suspended”); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9 (“Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended”).
19. MONT. CONST. OF 1884, art. I, § 18; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892) (“The object was to insure that a person
should not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might
tend to show that he himself had committed a crime.”).
21. State v. Devlin, 980 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Mont. 1999) (citing Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201,
210 (1988)).
22. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470–471 (1976).
23. “Testify,” meant “[t]o make a solemn declaration under oath or affirmation” and “to bear wit-
ness,” while “witness” meant “[a]ttestation of a fact or an event” and “testimony.” 1913 WEBSTER’S
DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 1490, 1660.
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language and the context, there are many places where the 1884 Constitu-
tion departed from the federal text without clearly affecting a substantive
change to the protection, rather than a stylistic change.  It is necessary to
examine the direct difference between impair and abridge to address that
shortcoming.
2. Impair vs. Abridge: A Direct Comparison
It has been noted that, at least in theory, impair provides a broader
protection than abridge because prohibiting impairment is more compre-
hensive than prohibiting abridgment.24 Despite this textual difference, the
Montana Supreme Court has held the two words mean the same thing.25
To abridge means to shorten.26 In the First Amendment, this word has
been understood to mean no speech within the freedom may lose its First
Amendment protections by being placed outside the freedom.27 This idea is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to create new categories
outside the freedom.28 Speech within the freedom is still subject to regula-
tion, but the freedom provides the speech within its cloak varying levels of
protection that regulations must satisfy.29
To impair means to make worse, diminish in quantity or value, or to
deteriorate.30 Textually, impair is a more comprehensive protection than
abridge for at least three reasons. First, similar to the First Amendment,
Article I, Section 10 protects speech within the freedom.31 Second, similar
to the prohibition on abridgment preventing the government from shrinking
the freedom, the prohibition on impairment likewise prevents shrinking the
freedom because “impair” means “deteriorate.”32 Third, and most impor-
24. LARRY M. ELISON & FRITZ SNYDER, THE MONTANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 43 (G. Alan Tarr, ed., Ref. Guides to the State Constitutions of the U.S., 2001).
25. Id. at 43–44.
26. “Abridge” means “to make shorter” or “lessen.” 1913 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 15,
at 6.
27. Categories of speech that are not within “the freedom” include: Incitement (Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); Defamation (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974)); Obscenity (Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)); Child pornography (New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747 (1982)); Fighting words (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)); and True
threats (Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam)).
28. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (refusing to find that depictions of
animal cruelty are outside “the freedom.”).
29. Regulations of speech within the freedom must generally satisfy either strict scrutiny or inter-
mediate scrutiny, depending on the circumstances. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015)
(strict scrutiny for “content-based” regulations of speech); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781
(1989) (intermediate scrutiny for “content-neutral” regulations of speech).
30. “Impair.” 1913 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 733.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech[.]”).
32. “Impair.” 1913 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 733.
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tantly, the prohibition on impairment protects the quality33 and value34 of
the speech within the freedom, which indicates a more precise and exacting
level of protection that speech regulations must satisfy. Thus, the prohibi-
tion on impairment takes its protections one step further by providing not
only shall no speech within the freedom be placed outside the freedom, but
also no speech within the freedom may be diminished in quality or value.
These definitions, however, are not always consistent with the 1884
Constitution’s other uses of impair and abridge. The 1884 Constitution
used the term impair three other times, and abridge twice (unfortunately,
impair and abridge were never used within the same section).35
Impair first appears in the Contract Clause in Article I, Section 11.36
On its face, the Contract Clause seems to use impair in similar fashion to
the 1884 Constitution’s free speech protection: “That no ex-post facto law,
nor law impairing the obligation of contract, or retrospective in its operation
. . . shall be passed by the Legislative Assembly.”37 But if the Contract
Clause’s use of impair was intended to provide a similar protection to Arti-
cle 1, Section 10’s use of impair, then the argument impair provides more
protection than abridge is substantially weakened. This is because the 1884
Constitution’s Contract Clause is virtually identical to the U.S. Constitu-
tion’s Contract Clause,38 and the U.S. Constitution’s Contract Clause prohi-
bition on impairing the obligation of contracts had been rendered almost
meaningless by 1884 because of the Supreme Court’s long held precedent
that the states’ police power encompassed considerable authority to disrupt
contractual relationships in order to further the public interest.39  So if im-
pair in the 1884 Constitution’s Contract Clause carried the same weight, or
lack thereof, as impair in the U.S. Constitution’s Contract Clause, and the
1884 Convention intended to use impair uniformly throughout the 1884
Constitution, it is unlikely the 1884 Convention used impair in Article I,
33. Because a prohibition on impairment is a prohibition on making something worse. 1913 WEB-
STER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 733.
34. “Impair.” 1913 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 733.
35. “Impair” is found in Article I, sections 10, 11, 28 and Article IV, section 26 of the 1884 Mon-
tana Constitution. “Abridge” is used twice in Article XV, section 9.
36. The full text reads: “That no ex-post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or
retrospectives in its operation, or making any irrevocable grant of special privileges, franchises, or im-
munities shall be passed by the Legislative Assembly.”
37. MONT. CONST. OF 1884, art. I, §§ 10–11.
38. Id. art. I, § 11; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The full text reads: “No State shall enter into any
Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grants Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of
Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of
Attainder, ex post facto law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobil-
ity.”
39. Rediscovering the Contract Clause, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1414, 1414–1415 (1984); Stone v. Mis-
sissippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818–820 (1879) (contractual obligations not binding when repudiation is neces-
sary for effective exercise of police power).
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Section 10, to create a protection greater than abridge provided in the U.S.
Constitution. But there are substantial reasons why the uses cannot be
equated. First, given the Federal Constitution’s prohibition on laws impair-
ing contracts is against the states, not Congress, the 1884 Montana Consti-
tution’s Contract Clause had to at least provide the same protections as the
Federal Constitution’s Contract Clause. Because the Federal Constitution’s
Contract Clause is substantially similar to the 1884 Montana Constitution’s
Contract Clause,40 the 1884 Convention likely intended to march lockstep
with the Federal Constitution. But such is not the case with the First
Amendment and Article I, Section 10 because each uses a different prohibi-
tion, “abridge” and “impair,” respectively, meaning the intention to march
lockstep is not nearly as clear. Second, the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the Contract Clause was necessary to avoid two persons contracting to be
free from State regulation, which would completely undermine the State’s
police power.41  This means the use of impair in the 1884 Constitution’s
Contract Clause is not indicative of Article I, Section 10’s use of impair
because the Contract Clause would have no more punch if the word abridge
had been used when the subservience of the Contract Clause is due to its
ability to destroy the police power rather than any weaknesses inherent in
the term impair.  In essence, the difference is cognizable when Article I,
Section 10, uses impair instead of abridge due to the difference in the terms
themselves, whereas the difference is not cognizable when the 1884 Consti-
tution’s Contract Clause uses impair instead abridge, not because of any
similarity in the terms, but rather due to the potential the Contract Clause
has to destroy the police power.
Impair next appears in the Unenumerated Rights found in Article, I,
Section 28.42 The use of impair in the Unenumerated Rights section is espe-
cially revealing because the section is otherwise a mirror image of the U.S.
Constitution’s Ninth Amendment.43 This suggests Article I, Section 28’s
use of impair is perhaps at most in unison with Article I, Section 10’s use of
impair because both represent a deliberate choice to use the term in lieu of
the federal text. The 1884 Convention’s use of disparage and impair side-
by-side narrows the meaning of impair because disparage takes away one
of impair’s three meanings, to devalue. Disparage means to “dishonor by a
40. Although the sections are fairly different, the Contract Clause of each section is basically the
same.
41. Elmer W. Roller, The Impairment of Contract Obligations and Vested Rights, 6 MARQ. L. REV.
129, 130 (1922); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905) (“[P]arties by entering into contracts
may not estop the legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good.”).
42. The full text reads: “The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not be con-
strued to deny, impair, or disparage others retained by the people.”
43. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The full text reads: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”
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comparison with what is inferior,” “to lower in rank or estimation by ac-
tions or words,” “to speak slightingly of,” “to depreciate,” or “to under-
value.”44 This means Article I, Section 28’s use of impair was added to
prohibit both deteriorating unenumerated rights and qualitatively diminish-
ing unenumerated rights. Applied to Article I, Section 28, to disparage is to
undervalue an unenumerated right by providing it with less protection than
an enumerated right. This might mean the legislature is prohibited from
regulating at will an unenumerated right simply because it is an unenumer-
ated right. To impair is to take away an unenumerated right, i.e. deteriorate,
or to affirmatively reduce the quality of the unenumerated right. This might
mean the legislature is prohibited from making an unenumerated right non-
existent, and that the legislature is prohibited from reducing the quality of a
person’s exercise of the unenumerated right.  Thus, if the 1884 Convention
intended impair to provide the same protection in Article I, Section 10, as it
did in Article I, Section 28, impair’s meaning in Article I, Section 10, can
be narrowed to mean a prohibition on deterioration and qualitative dimin-
ishment.
The last place impair appears is in Article IV, Section 26. Under Arti-
cle IV, Section 26, the legislature may not pass a law “authorizing the crea-
tion, extention [sic] or impairing of liens.”45 Although “impairing” a lien
fits squarely within the definition of impair thus far established, the use of
impair in this section provides little insight into the 1884 Convention’s in-
tention because there is no case law on the section, no corresponding fed-
eral text, and the section has since been scrapped from the Montana Consti-
tution altogether.
Abridge appears twice within Article XV, Section 9. This section rein-
forces the point that the convention thought impair and abridge have differ-
ent meanings, and that the choice to use either in the various places they are
found was a deliberate one. Article XV, Section 9 reads:
The right of eminent domain shall never be abridged, nor so construed as to
prevent the Legislative Assembly from taking the property and franchises of
incorporated companies, and subjecting them to public use the same as the
property of individuals; and the police powers of the State shall never be
abridged, or so construed as to permit corporations to conduct their business
in such manner as to infringe the equal rights of individuals, or the general
well-being of the State.46
Article XV, Section 9 uses abridge consistently with the First Amend-
ment. Just as the First Amendment prevents speech within “the freedom”
44. “Disparage.” 1913 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 428.
45. The full text of Article IV, section 26 is impossibly large, but the pertinent part states: “The
Legislative Assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases . . .
authorizing the creation, extention, or impairing of liens.”
46. MONT. CONST. OF 1884, art. XV, § 9.
8
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from being placed outside “the freedom,” Article XV, Section 9 prevents
property within “eminent domain” from being placed outside “eminent do-
main.” The second clause qualifies the first; it affirmatively places the prop-
erty and franchises of incorporated companies within “eminent domain,”
thus preventing them from ever being placed outside “eminent domain.”
Similarly, Article XV, Section 9 uses abridge to protect the police power of
the state. Similar to the eminent domain provision, the second clause quali-
fies the first; it affirmatively states that within the state’s “police power” is
the ability to regulate corporations that infringe on the equal rights of indi-
viduals, thus preventing those corporations from being placed beyond the
state’s “police power.” If the 1884 Convention has used impair instead of
abridge, it would have led to different results. Impair has been used in the
other provisions to mean deteriorate and diminish in quality. If impair had
been used in Article XV, Section 9, it would have prevented placing corpo-
rate property outside the power of “eminent domain,” and also reducing
“eminent domain” in quality.47
The contemporaneous definition of impair; its use in Article I, Section
28; and Article XV, Section 9’s use of abridge lead to the conclusion im-
pair was intended to provide more protection than abridge in Article I, Sec-
tion 10 of the 1884 Montana Constitution. The two terms’ coexistence in
the same document underscores this point. While a prohibition on abridging
a right protected any acts within that right from being placed outside of the
right, a prohibition on impairing a right went one step further by providing
the right may not be deteriorated or diminished in quality either. Thus, the
1884 Constitution provided a heightened layer of protection against regula-
tions that might chill, i.e. deteriorate or diminish in quality, speech.
B. The 1889 Constitution: Deliberately Choosing
“Impair” Over “Abridge”
The 1889 Montana Constitution made no substantive changes to the
1884 Montana Constitution’s Article I, Section 10.48 Interestingly, how-
ever, during the 1889 Convention an amendment was proposed replacing
“impair” with “abridge.” Unfortunately, the record is silent as to why the
amendment was declined, but the language of the proposed amendment is
47. By, for instance, laws that regulated how much property the State could take, or perhaps the
only areas where the State could take property. Such laws would reduce the “quality” of eminent do-
main.
48. The full text reads: “No law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech; every person shall
be free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on any subject, being responsible for all abuse of that
liberty; and that in all suits and prosecutions for libel, the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and the
jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the facts.” MONT. CONST. OF 1884, art.
III, § 10.
9
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still valuable. Delegate Winston, of Deer Lodge, proposed the following
amendment:
Declaration of Rights. Section 10. Every citizen may freely speak, write and
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for all abuse of that
right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or
of the press. In all suits or prosecutions for libel, the truth may be given in
evidence to the jury, and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged
as libelous was true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable
ends, the party shall be acquitted and the jury, under the direction of the court,
shall determine the law and the fact.49
It is entirely possible this amendment was not adopted strictly because
of the wordy phrasing of the libel clause. But it is equally plausible that if
the convention liked the change from “impair” to “retrain or abridge,” they
could have made the change while keeping the 1884 Constitution’s libel
clause.
The proposed amendment also offered a subtle, albeit significant, dif-
ference. “[N]o law passed to restrain or abridge,” implies legislative intent
is the test. If such language had been adopted, it is likely every content-
neutral law would pass muster because none are passed to restrain speech;
the restraint of speech is merely incidental.50 “No law shall be passed im-
pairing,” on the other hand, implies any law that sufficiently “impairs” the
freedom of speech is unconstitutional, thus bringing every content-neutral
law within its consideration.
The 1889 Constitution’s contribution to the discussion is small, but
important. The 1884 Convention offered numerous clues to the difference
between impair and abridge, but, other than the use of impair itself, did not
provide hard evidence of the convention deliberately declining abridge in
favor of impair. The 1889 Convention provides that missing link.
C. The 1972 Constitution: Demanding a Progressive
Freedom of Speech
A lot changed between the 1889 Constitution and the 1972 Constitu-
tion. The First Amendment’s free speech clause was incorporated against
the states, meaning any state constitution had to provide at least the same
protections as the First Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court also decided
United States v. Carolene Products,51 giving rise to varying levels of scru-
49. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: HELD IN THE CITY OF HE-
LENA, MONTANA JULY 4, 1889, AUGUST, 17, 1889, 118 (1921).
50. This is an especially important distinction given it was thirty-six years prior to incorporation of
the First Amendment’s free speech clause against the States, and forty-nine years before the famous
footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
51. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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tiny, including the United States v. O’Brien52 test. The freedom of expres-
sion, or conduct-based speech, was widely recognized.53 The 1972 Conven-
tion took care to address these developments, and to expand on them. In so
doing, the 1972 Convention relied on the free speech principles laid down
by the 1884 and 1889 Constitutions.
1. The Rejected Proposal
Delegate Bob Campbell54 offered a proposal to the Bill of Rights
Committee for “a new constitutional section to ensure the rights of individ-
ual dignity, privacy, and free expression.”55 The proposed section provided:
The rights of individual dignity, privacy, and free expression being essential
to the well-being of a free society, the state shall not infringe upon these
rights without the showing of a compelling state interest.56
Although all three of Delegate Campbell’s new rights found their way
into the 1972 Constitution, only the right of privacy retained the compelling
interest language.57 This can be read multiple ways. It could mean rights of
dignity and speech or expression are absolute, and the 1972 Constitution
placed a complete prohibition on infringing them. This reading is unlikely
given that Carolene Products’ tiers of judicial scrutiny were in existence
and content-neutral laws were commonly accepted permissible regulations.
The more likely reading is privacy was more important than either dignity
or speech; whereas infringement of dignity and speech could be justified by
a content-neutral substantial government interest, only a compelling gov-
ernment interest could justify infringing privacy.  Regardless, Delegate
Campbell’s rejected proposal is the first time the term “expression” was
considered by the 1972 Convention.  Apparently, the 1972 Convention ap-
preciated the term’s inclusion because “expression” became an integral part
of the proposal that was ultimately accepted, and enshrined, in the 1972
Constitution.
52. 391 U.S. 367, 376–377 (1968) (“[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmen-
tal interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than essential to the further-
ance of that interest.”).
53. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
54. Fritz Snyder & Mae Nan Ellingson, The Lawyer-Delegates of the 1972 Montana Constitutional
Convention: Their Influence and Importance, 72 MONT. L. REV. 53, 58 (2011) (“perhaps the most
idealistic of the lawyer-delegates . . . .”).
55. 3 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 266 (1981). [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT III].
56. 1 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 127 (1979). [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT I].
57. Compare MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4, 7 with MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
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2. The Accepted Proposal
Upon reaching a unanimous vote for the adoption of its newly drafted
Bill of Rights, the Bill of Rights Committee submitted a memo to the Con-
vention:
The Bill of Rights Committee submits herewith a proposed new Declaration
of Rights of the People of the State of Montana. The proposed article is in-
tended to replace in its entirety Article III of the [1889 Constitution]. In doing
so, the committee notes that not one of the traditional rights of that Declara-
tion has been diminished; and, to meet the changing circumstances of contem-
porary life, new safeguards have been added where appropriate.58
The memo is important because it illustrates the 1972 Convention’s
adoption of the 1889 Constitution’s principles, and it either meant to keep
them the same, or expand upon them. With regard to the freedom of speech,
it is clear from the text that the convention meant to expand the right. The
new freedom of speech section, which the convention overwhelmingly ap-
proved with no amendments,59 reads:
Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Press. No law shall be passed impairing
the freedom of speech or expression. Every person shall be free to speak or
publish whatever he will on any subject, being responsible for all abuse of
that liberty. In all suits and prosecutions for libel or slander the truth thereof
may be given in evidence; and the jury, under the direction of the court, shall
determine the law and the facts.60
Accompanying the Bill of Rights Committee’s submittal of the new
freedom of speech section was perhaps the most important comment in
Montana’s free speech history:
The committee unanimously proposes this adoption of former Article III, Sec-
tion 10 with one substantive change. The freedom of speech is extended, in
line with federal decisions under the First Amendment, to cover the freedom
of expression. Hopefully, this extension will provide impetus to the courts in
Montana to rule on various forms of expression similar to the spoken word
and the ways in which one expresses his unique personality in an effort to re-
balance the general backseat status of states in the safeguarding of civil liber-
ties. The committee wishes to stress the primacy of these guarantees in the
hope that their enforcement will not continue merely in the wake of the fed-
eral case law.61
This comment is important because it indicates that progressively pro-
tecting the freedom of speech, whether spoken or through expression, is
within the original meaning of the section. This meaning, combined with
the heightened protection already provided by impair, is a directive to the
58. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT II, supra note 5, at 618.
59. 5 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 1651 (1981). [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT V].
60. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 7.
61. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT II, supra note 5, at 630.
12
Montana Law Review, Vol. 77 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol77/iss1/4
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\77-1\MON105.txt unknown Seq: 13  9-FEB-16 12:45
2016 TRAILING IN THE WAKE 73
Montana Supreme Court to proactively protect speech, rather than merely
following federal precedent. The ratification record indicates the voters also
understood and believed that the freedom of expression contained in their
constitution was a more protective right, separate and independent of the
First Amendment.
3. The Ratification Record
There is a general disagreement over whose understanding is more au-
thoritative: the drafters or the lawmakers—the people who voted to ratify
the constitution.62 If the goal of this article was to settle that debate, it
would be a poor vehicle for it because the ratification record indicates the
drafters and lawmakers intended similar meanings regarding Article II, Sec-
tion 7.63
The document that most likely helped voters understand the new free-
dom of speech provision was a voter pamphlet containing the official pro-
posed text with accompanying explanations, published by the 1972 Con-
vention for the voters of Montana.64 Although newspapers at the time gen-
erally stated the freedom of speech had been “broadened,”65 the voter
pamphlet provided voters with context for the new constitution they were
considering by explaining the differences between the 1889 and 1972 con-
stitutions.66 The voter pamphlet explicitly differentiated between rights re-
tained from the 1889 Constitution and new rights added to the proposed
1972 Constitution.67 Under the rights retained section, the voter pamphlet
states: “No rights protected by the present Montana Declaration of Rights
are deleted or abridged in the proposed Constitution. These include the free-
dom of speech[.]”68 This statement is important because it informs the vot-
ers that while certain rights have been carried over, none of those have
62. Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s Quest for Original
Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 226–228 (2004). An offshoot of the “original understanding of the
voters” method is the “original public meaning” method, which is the objective public meaning to a
reasonable person at the time of ratification. “Original public meaning” is often used when the “original
understanding of the voters” is unascertainable.
63. An excellent resource (used extensively for this article) for those interested in the 1972 Mon-
tana Constitution’s ratification record is located at http://www.umt.edu/law/library/montanaconstitution/
default.php.
64. PROPOSED 1972 CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF MONTANA: OFFICIAL TEXT WITH EXPLANA-
TION (1972) [hereinafter VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET].
65. Con Con Delegates OK Bans on Discrimination, HELENA ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 8, 1972,
http://perma.cc/9KES-UUFA. One even quoted the Bill of Rights Committee’s comment on the new
freedom of speech provision. Frank Adams, Bill of Rights is Good, but It Could Have Been Better, THE
MONTANA STANDARD, Mar. 13, 1972; CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT II, supra note 5, at
630.
66. VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET, supra note 64, at 5.
67. Id. at 3.
68. Id.
13
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decreased their protections. This is another way of stating if there has been
a change in the right, it has only increased the right’s minimum level of
protection. This notion, that some rights have remained the same while
others have increased, is further communicated in the pamphlet’s explana-
tion of the Declaration of Rights section. For instance, the right to suffrage,
the right to keep and bear arms, and the freedom of speech are classified as
rights that “have not been deleted or abridged,” meaning at the very least
they have stayed the same, but potentially could be more protective.69 The
Explanation section then informs the voter whether and how the rights have
changed. The Explanation section of both the right to suffrage and the right
to keep and bear arms states “[i]dentical to 1889 constitution.”70 From that
explanation, the voters know they will enjoy those two freedoms under the
1972 Constitution just as they did in the 1889 Constitution—no more and
no less. In contrast, the Explanation section of the freedom of speech ex-
plains that the right has not remained the same, and instead is more protec-
tive. The Explanation section states “[r]evises 1889 constitution by enlarg-
ing a citizen’s freedom to express himself[.]”71Voters would understand the
explanation to mean the 1972 Constitution offered a more protective free-
dom of speech than the 1889 Constitution.
The text of the 1972 Constitution, the 1972 Constitutional Conven-
tion’s debates, and the ratification record are all seemingly in agreement
that the 1972 Constitution’s freedom of speech provision stands on its own
with heightened protections, separate and distinct from the First Amend-
ment. The question becomes whether the Montana Supreme Court has
given Article II, Section 7, the same meaning.
III. APPLYING THE 1972 DIRECTIVE TO THE MONTANA
SUPREME COURT’S PRECEDENTS
Three areas of speech in Montana, the Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire72
“fighting words” exception, political speech, and expressive conduct, indi-
cate the Montana Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is trending in the wrong
direction.  More broadly, these categories of speech, when taken together,
illustrate the fundamental problem with tethering Article II, Section 7’s pro-
tection to the First Amendment.  Instead of recognizing an arguably
stronger—but certainly independent—right, the protection afforded
Montanans’ speech is bound by U.S. Supreme Court precedent.  U.S. Su-
69. Id.
70. Id at 6.
71. Id.
72. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
14
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preme Court precedent is always subject to change, including regression,73
and once established, is sometimes rarely revisited for clarification.74  By
strictly following First Amendment precedent, the Montana Supreme Court
fails to uphold speech that should be protected under Article II, Section 7,
even if it is not protected under the First Amendment.  It also risks misap-
plying the First Amendment, thus depriving Montanans of even that mini-
mally required safeguard.
A. Fighting Words and Matters of Public Interest
Unsurprisingly, the “fighting words” exception is one of the more de-
veloped areas of free speech in Montana. 75 In Chaplinsky, the United
States Supreme Court held “fighting words” can be prevented and punished
without raising any First Amendment issues.76 The Court defined “fighting
words” to mean “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace.”77 In the years since Chaplinsky
was decided, the United States Supreme Court has never again upheld a
conviction based on the “fighting words” exception.78 Although Chaplin-
sky’s “fighting words” exception has not been overturned, the United States
Supreme Court has reversed the conviction each time it has reviewed a case
involving “fighting words.”79 Montana, on the other hand, “has demon-
strated a greater willingness to uphold convictions based on ‘fighting
words.’”80
When Montana quells speech under Chaplinksy’s “fighting words” ex-
ception, the speech often concerns matters of public interest, namely the
relationship between citizens and the police. This is perhaps the original sin
of Chaplinsky: Chaplinsky was convicted for telling a city marshal “You
are a God damned racketeer” and “a damned Fascist and the whole govern-
ment of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists.”81 Given the United
States Supreme Court’s efforts in the years since to narrow, perhaps even
73. Regression can often be fairly quick. Compare Citizens United v. Fed. Election Com’n, 558
U.S. 310 (2010) with Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
74. See John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291, 337 (2009)
(“The secondary effects doctrine is among the least understood of First Amendment principles . . . [t]he
Supreme Court is largely to blame for this, having failed to explain what is meant by a secondary effect
or why this should matter for constitutional purposes.”).
75. The “fighting words” exception was adopted in City of Whitefish v. O’Shaughnessy, 704 P.2d
1021, 1024 (Mont. 1985) (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572).
76. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–572.
77. Id. at 572.
78. State v. Dugan, 303 P.3d 755, 762 (Mont. 2013).
79. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1002 (3d. ed. 2006).
80. Dugan, 303 P.3d at 764.
81. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.
15
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undo, Chaplinsky’s application,82 Montana, by continuing to apply Chaplin-
sky, is arguably affording its citizens less protection than even the U.S.
Constitution provides. This fact becomes all the more concerning in light of
the Montana Constitution’s heightened protection of speech. Montana’s
fighting words cases provide ample evidence of speech under the Montana
Constitution being afforded less protection than speech under the U.S. Con-
stitution.
The first case is City of Whitefish v. O’Shaughnessy,83 where, while
walking home at 2:00 a.m. and in response to an officer asking him and his
friends to keep it down, O’Shaughnessy got in the back of the officer’s
patrol car, got out, then got back in, and back out again.84 He then tried to
high-five the officer. When the officer refused, O’Shaughnessy said, “well,
mother-fucker, I will holler and yell when and wherever I want if I want
to.”85 The Court held O’Shaugnessy’s speech constituted unprotected fight-
ing words.86
Following O’Shaughnessy was State v. Robinson.87 In Robinson, the
defendant, seemingly unprovoked, crossed the street in a crowd and called
an officer a “fucking pig.”88 The officer approached Robinson and asked if
there was anything he wanted to talk about, and Robinson replied “fuck off,
asshole.”89 The Court held Robinson’s speech constituted unprotected fight-
ing words.90
State v. Dugan91 distinguished itself from O’Shaughnessy and Robin-
son.92 Dugan called someone a “fucking cunt” over the phone.93 The Court
held Dugan’s speech was not fighting words because it had happened over
the phone instead of being uttered in a public place or in a face-to-face
setting.94
City of Billings v. Nelson,95 in turn, distinguished itself from Dugan
based on Dugan’s face-to-face setting rule.96 Nelson’s vehicle pulled up
82. Dugan, 303 P.3d at 762.
83. 704 P.2d 1021 (Mont. 1985).
84. Id. at 1022–1023.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1024.
87. 82 P.3d 27 (Mont. 2003).
88. Id. at 28.
89. Id. at 28–29.
90. Id. at 31.
91. 303 P.3d 755 (Mont. 2013).
92. Id. at 764–767.
93. Id. at 759.
94. Id. at 767
95. 322 P.3d 1039 (Mont. 2014).
96. Id. at 1042, 1045.
16
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next to her 13-year-old neighbor, whom she called a “spic bastard.” The
Court held Nelson’s speech constituted unprotected fighting words.97
Both O’Shaughnessy and Robinson represent significant erosions of
free speech under Article II, Section 7.98 Although Montanans cannot goad
police officers with fighting words at will, neither O’Shaughnessy nor
Robinson did so. Neither spoke words that invited a fight with the police
officer. If anything, each voiced a sincere dislike of Montana’s police
power to the most visible symbol of that police power. The Robinson Court
acknowledged this when it admitted if Robinson called the officer a “fuck-
ing pig” at a political rally, free speech “might well” prevail.99 Despite that
concession, the Court upheld a conviction the United States Supreme Court
would not hesitate to reverse.100 In fact, the Robinson Court went out of its
way to explicitly reject Ninth Circuit precedent that protected Robinson’s
communication, choosing instead to apply O’Shaughnessy.101 This is glar-
ing because it expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s more protective appli-
cation of the fighting words exception under the First Amendment in favor
of applying a less protective application of the fighting words exception
under Article II, Section 7.  Article II, Section 7, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, has to provide at least the same protection as the First Amend-
ment, and under the original meaning is supposed to provide more protec-
tion. There can be little doubt the Court’s decision to uphold the threat of
criminal prosecution for expressing displeasure with the police will chill the
kind of speech that lies at the heart of the First Amendment and Article II,
Section 7.102
Dugan seemingly recognized Montana’s eagerness to label speech as
fighting words, and added a safeguard to scale back the increasingly over-
used exception. Although only a small step,103 the requirement that fighting
97. Id. at 1045.
98. Although the Robinson opinion declared it was proceeding under only the U.S. Constitution, it
relied almost exclusively on O’Shaughnessy, which was based on Article II, section 7. Furthermore,
given that the Montana Supreme Court has consistently held the Montana Constitution affords no greater
protection than the U.S. Constitution, it was an odd distinction to make. The distinction has likely
already been lost because both Dugan and Nelson, both decided under Article II, section 7, used Robin-
son as precedent.
99. Robinson, 82 P.3d at 31.
100. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–452 (2011) (quoting Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss
Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 758–759 (1985) (citations omitted)) (“[S]peech on public issues occupies the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection.”).
101. Robinson, 82 P.3d at 30.
102. United States. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2548 (2012); see also Montana Auto. Ass’n v.
Greely, 632 P.2d 300, 305 (Mont. 1981) (“Criticism of government is at the very center of the constitu-
tional protection of free speech.”).
103. Primarily brought about by legal scholarship. See Dugan, 303 P.3d at 766–767 (citing various
law review articles).
17
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words be spoken face-to-face104 prevents the exception from expanding into
telephonic or digital communications in a world where such communica-
tions are quickly becoming the preferred method of communication. But the
implication from the Dugan analysis is if the communication had been spo-
ken face-to-face, it would have been unprotected “fighting words.” Nelson
is the realization of that implication.105 While Dugan and Nelson protect
someone who expresses displeasure to the police over the phone, they undo
none of O’Shaughnessy and Robinson’s chilling effects if someone wants to
express displeasure with the police in person. Under current precedent, not
only are Montanans denied heightened protections under Article II, Section
7 to voice opinions on matters of public interest, they are actually denied
the protections of the First Amendment, too.
B. Political Speech
The First Amendment has been said to have its “fullest and most ur-
gent application” in the arena of political speech.106 The recent decisions in
Citizens United v. FEC107 and McCutcheon v. FEC108 certainly underscore
that sentiment, although Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar109 has since limited
Citizen United’s reach in judicial elections. Interestingly, as with the “fight-
ing words” exception, when Montana recently broke from federal precedent
in the political speech context, it did so to provide less protection, not more.
Despite Citizens United’s strong language that “[a]n outright ban on
corporate political speech”110 is not permissible under the First Amend-
ment, the Montana Supreme Court upheld an outright ban on corporate po-
litical speech in Western Tradition Partnership v. Attorney General of
State.111 The dissent,112 and subsequent rapidly-issued reversal from the
United States Supreme Court,113 painted Western Tradition Partnership as
104. Dugan, 303 P.3d at 767.
105. See Nelson, 322 P.3d at 1045 (citing Dugan, 303 P.3d at 765–767) (“The fact that Nelson and
[her co-defendant] were in a car does not mean their speech could not have incited an immediate violent
response from a listener on the street.”).
106. Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (citing Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271–272 (1971)).
107. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
108. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
109. 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1673 (2015) (upholding a state law that prohibited judicial candidates from
personally soliciting campaign funds).
110. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361.
111. 271 P.3d 1, 13 (Mont.2011).
112. Id. at 17 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (“What ‘unique’ interests render Montana exempt from Citi-
zens United? One searches the Court’s Opinion in vain to find any.”).
113. Am. Tradition P’ship. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam) (“Montana’s argu-
ments in support of the judgment below either were already rejected in Citizens United, or fail to mean-
ingfully distinguish that case.”).
18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 77 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol77/iss1/4
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\77-1\MON105.txt unknown Seq: 19  9-FEB-16 12:45
2016 TRAILING IN THE WAKE 79
an effort to undermine the First Amendment’s protection of corporate
speech in the political arena. Under Citizens United’s broad protection of
corporate political speech, it certainly seems true. But interestingly, West-
ern Tradition Partnership marked a departure from an otherwise highly
protected area of speech in Montana, evidenced by Montana Automobile
Ass’n v. Greely,114 where the Montana Supreme Court made great efforts to
accommodate lobbying speech.115 Greely concerned a ballot initiative that
amended Montana’s lobbying act, including prohibiting any attempt by lob-
byists to “influence the action of any public official on any measure . . . [by
the] promise of support or opposition at any future election,”116 and prohib-
iting organizations from soliciting “directly, indirectly or by an advertising
campaign, the lobbying efforts of another person.”117 Although the Court
noted that “[w]hen these laws have been challenged, the courts have not had
difficulty finding a compelling interest as a basis for enactment,”118 it unan-
imously struck down both provisions of the initiative as unconstitutional
regulations of speech.119 The length Greely went to protect lobbying speech
is exhibited not only in the extensive analysis done under the First Amend-
ment,120 but also in the Court’s use of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause121 to promote the lobbying speech and interests of non-Montana citi-
zens.122
Western Tradition Partnership and Greely march in almost opposite
directions, with Western Tradition Partnership shrugging off friendly First
Amendment precedent to provide speech less protection, and Greely apply-
ing less-friendly First Amendment precedent123 to provide speech more
protection.124 The only real commonality between Western Tradition Part-
nership and Greely is in their treatment of Article II, Section 7. Any men-
tion of Article II, Section 7, is noticeably absent from Western Tradition
Partnership, while Greely only passively references Article II, Section 7,125
instead choosing to analyze the issue solely under First Amendment prece-
114. 632 P.2d 300 (Mont. 1981).
115. Id. at 311
116. Id. at 305.
117. Id. at 306.
118. Id. at 303.
119. Id. at 305, 308.
120. Greely, 632 P.2d at 305–310.
121. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
122. Greely, 632 P.2d at 304; see also Anthony Johnstone, Outside Influence, 13 ELECTION L.J. 117,
137 (2014) (noting the Montana Supreme Court’s “odd analogy to a vague doctrine.”).
123. Greely, 632 P.2d at 303 (citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Young Americans for Freedom, Inc. v. Gorton, 522 P.2d 189 (Wash. 1974);
Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978); Montgomery County v. Walsh, 336 A.2d 97 (Md.
1975)).
124. Id. at 305–310.
125. See id. at 305, 308.
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dent.126 The lack of review under Article II, Section 7 is somewhat under-
standable in each case. Greely found the statute at issue violated the First
Amendment,127 which negated any need to discuss whether it violated the
potentially higher ceiling of Article II, Section 7.  When Western Tradition
Partnership was decided, it was widely understood that Article II, Section
7, provided no more protection than the First Amendment.128  Nonetheless,
both cases provide examples of the importance of Article II, Section 7’s
independence from the First Amendment. Given Greely’s scant treatment of
Article II, Section 7, it is reasonable to assume that had the statute not
violated the First Amendment, the analysis would have ended there. West-
ern Tradition Partnership confirms this notion: once the law was found not
to violate the First Amendment, the analysis ended. In either case, the
United States Constitution dictated the level of protection the speech re-
ceived, not the Montana Constitution. This represents the danger of not fol-
lowing Article II, Section 7’s original meaning: that is, refusing to acknowl-
edge a heightened protection under Article II, Section 7, and instead march-
ing lockstep with federal precedent.
In all likelihood, Williams-Yulee’s interpretation of the First Amend-
ment will mark another instance of the United States Constitution dictating
the level of protection afforded speech in Montana. Regulations concerning
judicial candidates will be held valid under the First Amendment without
any independent analysis of whether the regulations violate Article II, Sec-
tion 7. Judicial candidates’ speech should be susceptible to valid regulation
in Montana like any other speech, but Williams-Yulee should not be disposi-
tive on the issue. Although Williams-Yulee was probably a welcome retreat
from Citizens United for many people, if current trends hold, the Montana
Supreme Court will continue to trail “in the wake” of the United States
Supreme Court. The fluctuation from Greely, up to Citizens United, and
then back down to Williams-Yulee, is precisely what the 1972 Convention
tried to guard against.
C. Expressive Conduct
Despite Article II, Section 7’s explicit protection of the freedom of
expression, and the 1972 Convention’s original intent, the Montana Su-
preme Court often designates seemingly expressive conduct as non-expres-
sive. Even though all courts deal with the reality that virtually all conduct
has the potential to be expressive, the Montana Supreme Court’s expressive
126. Id. at 305–310.
127. Id. at 305, 308.
128. See Krautter, 852 P.2d at 638.
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conduct decisions are especially unprotective.129 There are two different
ways to view this: on one hand, the Montana Supreme Court is strengthen-
ing its intermediate scrutiny precedent by finding dubiously expressive con-
duct as actually not expressive at all, but on the other, it’s not scrutinizing
regulations to ensure they are used for a valid, content-neutral purpose.
In one regard, a skeptical view of certain claims of violations of ex-
pressive conduct is actually protective of speech. Given the potentially end-
less amount of laws that arguably impair expressive conduct, finding most
conduct to be expressive would actually remove many teeth from the analy-
sis applied to the content-neutral laws that are usually implicated. For in-
stance, it is much simpler, and also probably doctrinally correct,130 to find a
porn actor’s refusal to wear a condom is non-expressive conduct that does
not implicate the freedom of speech,131 than to find it is expressive conduct,
but the expressive conduct is nonetheless lawfully impaired by a content-
neutral regulation. If such conduct were deemed expressive, not only would
the result be the same,132 but there would also be another decision added to
the growing list of precedent where an expression gave way to the law
impairing it.
On the other hand, by refusing to acknowledge certain conduct is ex-
pressive, courts are not providing expressive conduct with the minimally
required safeguard of content-neutral analysis, even if the teeth of content-
neutral analysis have been somewhat blunted.133 It certainly seems the 1972
Convention would adopt this view given the Bill of Rights Committee’s
comment that “expression” was included in Article II, Section 7 to “provide
impetus” to Montana courts to rule on the “various forms of expression
similar to the spoken word” and the way one “expresses his unique person-
ality.”134
For the most part, the Montana Supreme Court has declined to recog-
nize many forms of expressive conduct. While it has recognized expressive
conduct in corporate expenditures,135 promising or refusing support to a
129. David Cole & William N Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment
Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HAR. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 319 (1994).
130. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (Under the First Amendment, conduct is
expressive if there is an intent to convey a particularized message, and a great likelihood that the mes-
sage would be understood by those who viewed it.).
131. Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 774 F.3d 566, 571 (9th Cir. 2014).
132. Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems
in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 49 (2000) (“[I]ncreasingly in free speech
law, the central inquiry is whether the government action is content based or content neutral.”).
133. Id. (“[I]n almost every free speech case decided by the Supreme Court . . . the outcome de-
pended, in large part, on whether the Court characterized the law as content based or content neutral.”).
134. See CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT II, supra note 5, at 630.
135. W. Tradition P’ship, 291 P.3d at 556 (albeit probably reluctantly).
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political candidate,136 and sending letters,137 it has been reluctant to find
other forms of conduct expressive. Placing anti-religious bumper stickers in
mailboxes,138 nude dancing,139 physically resisting removal from a council
meeting,140 honking a horn to protest an RV Park on the Yellowstone
River,141 and standing in front of a hunter to prevent him from shooting a
wild bison,142 have all been found to be non-expressive conduct. What is
most alarming about these decisions is not the outcome; in most of the
cases, if not all, there was a valid content-neutral law that would have law-
fully impaired the expression. Instead, it is alarming that, despite the Mon-
tana Supreme Court’s holding, all of these cases clearly involve expressions
intended to convey a message. This is particularly true in light of U.S. Su-
preme Court cases where the conduct was more egregious yet was still
found to be expressive, thus requiring the U.S. Supreme Court to analyze
whether the expression was protected.143
The continued limitation of Article II, Section 7’s scope has quite large
implications: if honking a horn in protest is not expressive, then it is not
speech, and if it is not speech, the legislature can ban it without implicating
Article II, Section 7.144 Any notion of triviality for banning honking a horn
in protest should evaporate when honking a horn in protest is compared to
other types of expressive conduct. There is little, if any, discernable differ-
ence in the communicative nature between burning a flag in protest145 and
honking a horn in protest. Similarly, a person sleeping overnight in a
136. Greely, 632 P.2d at 305.
137. State v. Lance, 721 P.2d 1258, 1267–1270 (Mont. 1986); State v. Ross, 889 P.2d 161, 163–167
(Mont. 1995).
138. State v. Nye, 943 P.2d 96, 100 (Mont. 1997) (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409
(1974)) (“[T]he activity must be ‘sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the
scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.’ Nye has not shown that his conduct meets this test.”).
139. City of Billings v. Laedeke, 805 P.2d 1348, 1352 (Mont. 1991) (citing City of Daytona Beach
v. Del Percio, 476 So.2d 197, 203–204 (Fla. 1985)) (citations omitted) (holding the municipality’s in-
herent police power outweighed “the minimal speech protection at stake here.”).
140. State v. Lowery, 759 P.2d 158, 160 (Mont. 1988) (“[W]e conclude that Mr. Lowery’s actions in
physically resisting removal from the council meeting do not fit within the concept of speech protected
under the Constitution.”).
141. State v. Compas, 964 P.2d 703, 706 (Mont. 1998) (“Compas must prove that her horn honking
activities are constitutionally protected . . . [s]he has not done with regard to her ‘expressive conduct’
contention.”).
142. State v. Lilburn, 875 P.2d 1036, 1039–1044 (Mont. 1994) (In overbreadth analysis, finding
statute that proscribes “dissuad[ing]” a hunter from taking an animal as regulating primarily conduct, not
expression.).
143. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (cross burning); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343 (2003) (cross burning).
144. The regulation could, of course, be invalid on other grounds.
145. Flag burning was held protected by the First Amendment as expressive conduct in Johnson. 491
U.S. at 420.
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park146 communicates her message no better than a person standing in front
of a hunter. Not recognizing the aforementioned conduct as expressive
amounts to Montanans being denied even the minimal content-neutral safe-
guards of the First Amendment, let alone the heightened protections of Arti-
cle II, Section 7, which explicitly protects expression.
The 1972 Bill of Rights Committee comment drafted the freedom of
expression into Article II, Section 7 to “provide impetus to the courts in
Montana to rule on various forms of expression similar to the spoken word
and the ways in which one expresses his unique personality.”147 When nude
dancing and honking a horn in protest are not considered expressive, and
thus bans on either would not implicate Article II, Section 7, it is fair to say
the Montana Supreme Court has not been following that directive.
IV. CONCLUSION
In at least three areas, the Montana Supreme Court is following behind
federal precedent. Given the Court’s refusal to not march lockstep with the
United States Supreme Court in so many other areas148, it is an entirely
uncharacteristic development. Unfortunately, the Court’s decisions lag be-
hind basic First Amendment protections, meaning the Court is even farther
from giving Article II, Section 7 the meaning the drafters and voters in-
tended. However, there are plenty of ways to begin making progressive
change.
Litigants can challenge the very core of the problem: the conception of
Article II, Section 7, as providing no greater protection than the First
Amendment.  The precedent itself is based only on very weak reasoning in
City of Billings v. Laedeke,149 where the Court reached the conclusion be-
cause “[i]n the past, this Court has discussed the First Amendment and its
state counterpart without distinguishing between the two provisions.”150
While that may be true, it does not mean there is nothing to distinguish
between Article II, Section 7, and the First Amendment.  Not only can liti-
gants rely on the textual, and thus substantive, differences between Article
II, Section 7, and the First Amendment, there is also the extraordinary 1972
146. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294–295 (1984) (held expressive
conduct protected by the First Amendment).
147. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT II, supra note 5, at 630.
148. Woirhaye v. Montana Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 972 P.2d 800 (Mont. 1998) (trial by jury);
State v. Guillaume, 975 P.2d 312 (Mont. 1999) (double jeopardy); State v. Hardaway, 36 P.3d 900
(Mont. 2001) (search and seizure).
149. 805 P.2d 1348 (Mont. 1991).
150. Id. at 1351.
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Bill of Rights Committee comment stating Article II, Section 7, was drafted
specifically so the Court would not trail “merely in the wake of the federal
case law.”151
151. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT II, supra note 5, at 630.
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